

## Message Text

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 L-03  
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OMB-01 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 EB-08 COME-00 IO-13  
EA-10 EUR-12 MCE-00 /130 W  
-----036792 241518Z /45

P R 241250Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2950  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
ACDA  
AID  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 NEW DELHI 11261

FROM ODC NEW DELHI

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, IN  
SUBJECT: THE FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY  
ASSISTANCE FOR INDIA

REF: (A) SECSTATE 167901, DTG 010215Z JUL 78  
(B) SECSTATE 182987, DTG 192201Z JUL 78

THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS SUBMITTED AS REQUESTED BY REFERENCE (A)  
AND AMENDED BY REFERENCE (B) AND FOLLOWS FORMAT AND PARAGRAPHING  
CONTAINED IN PARA 3A OF REF A:

1. THE THRUST OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S OVERALL AND REGIONAL  
POLICY ON ARMS SUPPLY IS RESTRAINT. IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR POLICY  
TOWARD THE SUBCONTINENT, THE PRINCIPLES THAT THE US WILL NOT BECOME  
A MAJOR SUPPLIER, WILL NOT DISTURB THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE  
REGION AND WILL PROVIDE ASSISTANCE ON A CASH-ONLY BASIS SHOULD  
CONTINUE TO GOVERN. THIS POLICY IS DESIGNED TO SERVE OUR FUNDA-  
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MENTAL OBJECTIVE OF PROMOTING THE PROCESS OF NORMALIZATION OF  
RELATIONS IN THE REGION, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN.  
WE SEE, THEREFORE, A LIMITED ROLE ASSIGNED TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
PROGRAMS IN OUR OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE GOI. HOWEVER,  
PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN INDO-US  
RELATIONS, IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO PROMOTE A BETTER BALANCE IN  
INDIA'S SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS BY:

(A) BEING OPEN TO INDIAN INTEREST IN DIVERSIFYING ITS SOURCES FOR MILITARY SUPPLIES, INCLUDING LIMITED DIRECT SALES, CONSISTENT WITH THE RESTRAINTS OF OUR GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES.

(B) REDUCING SOVIET INFLUENCE BY INCREASING LEVELS OF TRAINING OF INDIAN MILITARY IN THE US.

2. THE GOI SEES PAKISTAN AND CHINA AS THE PRINCIPAL THREATS TO INDIA'S SECURITY. THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES ARE POSTURED TO DEFEND AGAINST CONVENTIONAL FORCES POISED TO THE NORTH WEST IN PAKISTAN AND TO THE NORTH EAST IN CHINA AND TIBET. WHILE THE INTENSITY OF THREAT IN BOTH OF THESE QUADRANTS HAS RECEDED SINCE ACTIVE FIGHTING OCCURRED IN 1971 AND 1962 RESPECTIVELY, A HIGH DEGREE OF SUSPICION AND DISTRUST FIRES DEMANDS FOR MAINTENANCE OF DEFENSE BUDGETS AND MODERNIZATION OF ARMS SO AS TO BE PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY. THE INDIANS HAVE ALSO ADDRESSED THIS PERCEIVED DANGER THROUGH DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. INDIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD BOTH THE PAKISTAN AND CHINA UNDER THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION HAS EMPHASIZED IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THESE AS WELL AS ALL NEIGHBORS BORDERING INDIA. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED, THE GOI VIEWS UNRESOLVED BORDER QUESTIONS AS POTENTIAL SOURCES OF CONFLICT. IT ALSO FEARS THAT INSTABILITY WITHIN PAKISTAN COULD DEFLECT THE PRESENT COURSE OF IMPROVING RELATIONSHIPS. AN ADDITIONAL CONCERN IS THAT SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION COULD ALSO AFFECT

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STABILITY IN THE REGION. AS A RESULT OF THIS PERCEIVED POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY AND LARGE-POWER COMPETITION, THE GOI SEEKS TO MAINTAIN RECENT LEVELS OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES AND TO HOLD FORCES RELATIVELY CONSTANT WHILE ATTEMPTING TO MODERNIZE BOTH DEFENSE INDUSTRIES AND DEPLOYED WEAPON SYSTEMS. INDIA'S INTERNAL STABILITY SEEMS TO INDICATE A LOW DEGREE OF THREAT OF EITHER SUCCESSFUL INTERNAL REVOLUTION OR SUBVERSION BY POLITICAL FORCES OVER THE SHORT TERM, AND INTERNAL DISTURBANCES CAN BE HANDLED BY THE FORCES OF SOCIAL CONTROL WITHIN INDIA WITHOUT GREAT DIFFICULTY.

3. IN OUR OPINION THE GOI NOW TAKES A MORE REALISTIC VIEW OF THE THREAT TO ITS SECURITY POSED BY PAKISTAN, BUT IT STILL EXAGGERATES THAT THREAT. CURRENT INDIAN VIEWS OF PAKISTAN ARE A PRODUCT OF HISTORIC AND HIGHLY EMOTIONAL ANTIPATHIES AS WELL AS THE NEED FOR SELF-JUSTIFICATION, AND ENHANCEMENT BY THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THE THREAT TO INDIA POSED BY CHINA, WHILE POTENTIALLY GREATER THAN THAT FROM PAKISTAN, IS, IN OUR OPINION, PRESENTLY NOT SERIOUS. WHILE THE BORDER IS NOT DEFINED, THERE IS A DE FACTO LINE WHICH THE GOI HAS CHOSEN NOT TO CONTEST. AS LONG AS THE INDIANS DO NOT DISPUTE THE STATUS QUO, THE BORDER ISSUE SHOULD REMAIN DORMANT.

4. THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES, WITH A PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF 1.6 MILLION, INCLUDING ARMED POLICE AND THE PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, ARE CAPABLE OF SUSTAINED OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED DURATION. THE INDIAN ARMY AT 29 DIVISIONS (WHICH MAY EVENTUALLY BE REORGANIZED TO INCORPORATE 35 DIVISIONS AT THE PRESENT MANPOWER LEVEL) IS CAPABLE OF SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS, BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE, AGAINST PAKISTAN AND COULD SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST A NON-NUCLEAR ATTACK BY CHINA. THE INDIAN

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P R 241250Z JUL 78  
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FROM ODC NEW DELHI

REF: (A) SECSTATE 167901, DTG 010215Z JUL 78  
(B) SECSTATE 182987, DTG 192201Z JUL 78

NAVY IS CAPABLE OF ACCOMPLISHING ITS MISSION AGAINST ANY NAVY OF THE INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL. THE INDIAN NAVY CAN BE EXPECTED TO EXPAND OVER THE NEXT TWO DECADES TO DOUBLE ITS PRESENT SIZE. THE INDIAN AIR FORCE AT 45 SQUADRONS AND 100,000 PERSONS, IS THE LARGEST AND MOST DIVERSIFIED

NON-COMMUNIST ASIAN AIR FORCE AND IS CAPABLE OF ACCOMPLISHING ITS ASSIGNED MISSIONS AGAINST PAKISTAN INDEFINITELY AND AGAINST THE PRC, IN A CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT, FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE MONTHS UNAIDED.

5. RECENT EMPHASIS ON THE INDIGENIZATION OF INDIA'S DEFENSE

INDUSTRIES AND THE ACQUISITION OF MODERN ARMAMENTS FROM BOTH WESTERN AND SOVIET BLOC SOURCES SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE FUTURE THRUST OF INDIA'S DEFENSE PROGRAM IS TO IMPROVE THE QUALITATIVE  
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PERFORMANCE OF THESE FORCES RATHER THAN THE QUANTITATIVE STRUCTURE. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GOI'S DESIRE TO ACQUIRE A NEW TACTICAL STRIKE AIRCRAFT FROM WESTERN EUROPE ON A CO-PRODUCTION BASIS IS PART OF ITS PROGRAM TO REPLACE OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT, DIVERSIFY ITS SOURCES, AND BUILD ITS NATIVE INDUSTRY. GIVEN US INTERESTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT AND THE FACT THAT INDIAN MILITARY FORCES FAR EXCEED THOSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOUTH ASIA, THE GOI'S MILITARY PROGRAM WARRANTS US SUPPORT ONLY IN A LIMITED WAY.

6. DEFENSE SPENDING DOES NOT PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN THE INDIAN ECONOMY. WE ESTIMATE THAT TOTAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES (THOSE IN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET PLUS OTHER IMPUTED DEFENSE COSTS) IN 1976-77 AMOUNTED TO DOLS 3.5 BILLION (AT RS. 8.50 EQUALS DOLS 1), OR 3.8 PERCENT OF 1976-77 GNP. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN THE CENTRAL GOVT BUDGET, AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP, WERE AN ESTIMATED 3.3 PERCENT IN THE 1976-77, 3.2 IN 1977-78 AND 3.3 IN 1978-79. DEFENSE SPENDING HAS BECOME A LESS IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF CENTRAL GOVT EXPENDITURES IN RECENT YEARS, DROPPING FROM 18.6 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL BUDGET IN 1976-77 TO 16.8 IN 1977-78 TO AN ESTIMATED 16 IN 1978-79. MILITARY IMPORTS (MOSTLY SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET UNION) ARE NOT INCLUDED IN GOI TRADE FIGURES. THE WORLD BANK ESTIMATES THAT SUCH IMPORTS AVERAGE AROUND DOLS 200 MILLION PER YEAR. ACCORDING TO PRELIMINARY FIGURES, TOTAL IMPORTS IN 1977-78 WERE DOLS 6.86 BILLION. INDIA PRESENTLY HAS RECORD FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES OF OVER DOLS 6 BILLION AND DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS.

7. DELETED PER REF B.

8. DELETED PER REF B.

9. DELETED PER REF B.

10. THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR INDIA ANTICIPATED FOR  
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FY80, 81 AND 82 INCLUDES NO MAJOR MILITARY ITEMS AND THEREFORE WILL NOT INTRODUCE NEW CAPABILITIES INTO THE REGION, NOR SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE ARMS ACQUISITION POLICIES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION AND WILL NOT AFFECT REGIONAL STABILITY.

11. THE NATURE OF OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DOES NOT AFFECT HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIA. THE PRESENT GOVT HAS RESTORED CIVIL LIBERTIES SUPPRESSED DURING THE EMERGENCY PERIOD AND MAINTAINS THE INDIAN TRADITION OF KEEPING THE MILITARY SEPARATE FROM CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND SUBORDINATE TO THE ELECTED OFFICIALS. IN SO FAR AS PROMOTING AND ADVANCING US HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES, IMETP PROVIDES THE INDIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE HIGH LEVEL MILITARY AND CIVILIANS WITH THE OPPORTUNITY NOT ONLY FOR GREATER APPRECIATION OF US MILITARY VALUES AND POLICIES BUT ALSO OF EXPOSURE TO HUMAN RIGHTS VALUES AND PRACTICES IN ANOTHER PLURALISTIC, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

12. ACCORDING TO THE WORLD BANK, TOTAL EXTERNAL AID DISBURSEMENTS TO INDIA IN 191:-7 AMOUNTED TO DOLS 1.84 BILLION, BROKEN DOWN INTO THE FOLLOWING MAJOR DONOR CATEGORIES: CONSORTIUM COUNTRIES, DOLS 850 MILLION; WORLD BANK, DOLS 490 MILLION; OPEC COUNTRIES, DOLS 312 MILLION; EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, DOLS 84 MILLION; AND OTHERS, DOLS 100 MILLION. AT THIS ASSISTANCE IS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT PROGRAM OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA IS FROM THE SOVIET UNION. IN 1977 THE USSR CONCLUDED MILITARY AGREEMENTS WITH INDIA WORTH DOLS 618 MILLION.

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P R 241250Z JUL 78  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2952  
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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 4 NEW DELHI 11261

FROM ODC NEW DELHI

REF: (A) SECSTATE 167901, DTG 010215Z JUL 78

(B) SECSTATE 182987, DTG 192201Z JUL 78

13. PARA 3(A) (13): FOLLOWING APPLIES FOR ALL LEVELS

DESCRIBED BELOW:

FMS (DEFENSE ARTICLES). SALES TOTAL ESTIMATED FOR FY79, PROJECTED FROM PREVIOUS YEARS ACTUAL SALES IS USED AS BASIS FOR CURRENT LEVEL PROJECTION.

FMS (TRAINING). ESTIMATED FOR FY79 BASED ON ANTICIPATED SALES AS ONLY TWO LOW COST COURSES WERE PURCHASED IN FY78. DUE TO IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN US AND GOI, INDICATIONS ARE THAT FMS TRAINING AMOUNTING UP TO DOLS 600K MAY BE PURCHASED IN FY79. THIS ESTIMATE IS USED AS BASIS FOR THE CURRENT LEVEL PROJECTION.

IMET: FY79 FUNDING LEVEL USED AS BASIS FOR CURRENT LEVEL. ALL TRAINING PROPOSED IS FOR US SCHOOLS.

PARA 3(A) (13) (A-E):

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LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL)

FMS (DEFENSE ARTICLES): LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR MAP. PROVIDED EQUIPMENT.

FMS (TRAINING): FLIGHT SAFETY OFFICER AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION COURSES.

IMET: 50 PERCENT OF CURRENT LEVEL.

THIS LEVEL OF FMS WILL PROVIDE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR C-119, C-121 AIRCRAFT, PEACE SAPPHIRE RADAR AND PEACE INDIGO EQUIPMENT. THESE SALES MUST BE CONTINUED DUE TO PREVIOUS SUPPORT AGREEMENTS. THIS LEVEL OF FMS WOULD BE VIEWED BY GOI AS DISCRIMINATORY, UNLESS OFFSET BY SIMILAR REDUCTIONS IN THE REST OF THE SUBCONTINENT. FMS TRAINING WOULD PROVIDE DIRELY NEEDED TRAINING IN SUPPORT OF US PROVIDED EQUIPMENT.

IMET AT THIS LEVEL ALLOWS A LIMITED NUMBER OF OFFICERS FROM EACH SERVICE TO ATTEND HIGHLY VISIBLE CONUS PROFESSIONAL MILITARY, ADVANCED MANAGEMENT, AND ESSENTIAL SPECIALIZED TRAINING. THE SHARP DEPARTURE FROM THE ESTBLISHED IMET FUNDING TREND COULD BE RECEIVED BY THE INDIAN GOVT WITH CONSEQUENT COOLING OF RELATIONS. HOWEVER, THE POTENTIAL FOR CREATING A DELICATE POLITICAL SITUATION IS OF GREATER SIGNIFICANCE THAN ANY ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE INDIAN MILITARY SINCE TRAINING WOULD BE OBTAINED FROM OTHER COUNTRIES TO INCLUDE THE SOVIET UNION. SOVIET INFLUENCE WOULD BECOME AN INCREASINGLY DOMINANT FACTOR WITH THE US PROVIDING NO ALTERNATIVES.

LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL):

FMS (DEFENSE ARTICLES): WOULD ALSO ACCOMMODATE JATO ROCKET BOOSTERS OR SIMILAR REQUIREMENTS.

FMS (TRAINING): ONE TEST PILOT COURSE PLUS COURSES INDENTIFIED IN LEVEL 1.

IMET: 75 PERCENT OF CURRENT LEVEL.

FMS AT THIS LEVEL WOULD CONTINUE TO PROVIDE DEFENSE ARTICLES

PURCHASED IN THE PAST, AND SATISFY A DIRELY NEEDED REQUIREMENT FOR TEST PILOT TRAINING, FOR ESTABLISHING INDIGENEOUS CAPABILITY.

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CURRENTLY, ONLY ALTERNATIVE FOR THIS TRAINING IS A COURSE OFFERED BY FRANCE, WHICH IS INFERIOR IN QUALITY. INDICATIONS ARE, HOWEFVER, THAT THIS TRAINING WOULD BE OBTAINED FROM OTHER SOURCES, POSSIBLY THE SOVIET UNION, IF NOT PROVIDED BY US. IMETP AT THIS LEVEL WOULD SATISFY 50 PERCENT OF GOI'S IDENTIFIED REQUIREMENTS FOR FY80. THIS FUNDING LEVEL WOULD DENY MANY OFFICERS WHO ARE RISING TOWARDS POSITIONS OF FUTURE LEADERSHIP EXPOSURE TO US, AND GOI WOULD BE COMPELLED TO SATISFY REQUIREMENTS ELSEWHERE RESULTING IN INCREASED DEPENDANCY ON OTHER COUNTRIES, NOTABLY THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH SUPPORT WOULD FALL CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF THE ESTABLISHED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR INDIA.

LEVEL 3 (CURRENT LEVEL):

FMS (DEFENSE ARTICLES): MAINTAIN FY79 LEVEL PROVIDED PURCHASES ARE CONSISTENT WITH US POLICY AND SUPPORTIVE OF THE ESTABLISHED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR INDIA.

FMS (TRAINING): PROVIDE ONE MORE TEST PILOT COURSE.

IMET: MAINTAINS FY79 FUNDING LEVEL OF 500K. FMS AT THIS LEVEL WOULD CONTINUE CURRENT LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE ARTICLES AND EXPEDITE DEVELOPING IN-COUNTRY CAPABILITY FOR TEST PILOT TRAINING. REQUIREMENTS, IF NOT SATISFIED BY US, WILL BE OBTAINED FROM OTHER SOURCES RESULTING IN INCREASED DEPENDANCE ON OTHER COUNTRIES, NOTABLY THE SOVIET UNION. IMETP AT THIS LEVEL WILL PROVIDE THE PROFESSIONAL AND SPECIALIZED TRAINING MOST ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY, BUT STILL FALLS CONSIDERABLY SHORT OF GOI IDENTIFIED REQUIREMENTS AND FAILS TO PROVIDE INCREASED LEVEL OF TRAINING IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTABLISHED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR INDIA.

INCREMENTAL LEVEL A:

FMS (DEFENSE ARTICLES): INCREASE MODESTLY FROM CURRENT LEVEL, PROVIDED REQUIREMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH US POLICY AND SUPPORTIVE OF THE ESTABLISHED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR INDIA.

FMS TRAININT: 10 PERCENT INCREASE OVER CURRENT LEVEL.

IMET: 10 PERCENT INCREASE OVER CURRENT LEVEL.

ANY LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS NOT SATISFIED BY US OR THROUGH DIVERSIFICATION FROM US ALLIES WILL RESULT IN GOI RELIANCE ON SOVIET OR SOVIET BLOC SUPPORT. THESE LEVELS FOR FMS TRAINIG

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AND IMET WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE ESTABLISHED TRAINING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR INDIA, AND WOULD CONTINUE CURRENTLY ESTABLISHED TREND FOR IMETP INCREASES.

INCREMENTAL LEVEL B:

FMS (DEFENSE ARTICLES)- SAME AS INCREMENTAL LEVEL A.

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OMB-01 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 EB-08 COME-00 IO-13  
EA-10 EUR-12 MCE-00 /130 W  
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P R 241250Z JUL 78  
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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 NEW DELHI 11261

FROM ODC NEW DELHI  
REF: (A) SECSTATE 167901, DTG 010215Z JUL 78  
(B) SECSTATE 182987, DTG 192201Z JUL 78

FMS (TRAINING) - 50 PERCENT INCREASE OVER CURRENT LEVEL.  
IMET- 50PERCENT INCREASE OVER CURRENT LEVEL.  
IMPACT OF NONSUPPORT OF LEGITIMATE REQUIREMENTS SAME AS FOR  
INCREMENTAL LEVEL A. INCREASE IN FMS TRAINING PROJECTS THE  
SAME PERCENT INCREASE AS FOR TRAINING IDENTIFIED BY GOI FOR IMETP  
IN FY80.  
IMETP AT THIS LEVEL REFLECTS A 50 PERCENT INCREASE FROM THE FY79  
PROGRAM. IT CONTAINS ALL GOI IDENTIFIED NEEDS FOR FY80 IMET.  
THIS LEVEL OF TRAINING WOULD CONSIDERABLY NEUTRALIZE DE-  
PENDENCE ON SOVIET UNION TRAINING WITH US SATISFYING MAJORITY OF  
GOI TRAINING THAT IS NOT AVAILABLE IN-COUNTRY.  
PARA 3(A) (13) (F): OFFICE OF DEFENSE COOPERATION, INDIA CURRENTLY  
IS MANNED WITH TWO MILITARY, ONE CIVILIAN SECRETARY, ONE LWR  
BUDGET EMPLOYEE, ONE IMETP/FMS LWR EMPLOYEE, ONE LOGISTICS/  
TRANSPORTATION LWR EMPLOYEE, AND ONE DRIVER. IN VIEW OF THIS  
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SPARCE MANNING ODC COULD NOT EFFECTIVELY ADMINISTER THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM WITH LESS MANNING IS ANY OF THE PROPOSED LEVELS.

## PROPOSED MANNING LEVELS

LEVEL	US MIL	US CIV	LWR
MINIMUM	2	1	4
INTERMEDIATE	2	1	4
:7443,5	2	1	4
INCREMENTAL A	2	1	4
INCREMENTAL B	3	1	4

## JUSTIFICATION:

MINIMUM: ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS WOULD NOT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE WORKLOAD FROM THE CURRENT LEVEL TO PERMIT REDUCTION IN CURRENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH. INTERMEDIATE: SAME AS FOR MINIMUM.

CURRENT: MANNING CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED HAS BEEN IN EFFECT SINCE FY77 FOR THE MILITARY AND SINCE FY78 FOR LWR. THESE LEVELS REPRESENT 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN MILITARY MANNING AND 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN LWR FROM THE FY76 JMP. THE REDUCTIONS WERE RECOMMENDED AND EFFECTED AT A TIME WHEN THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE EFFORT WAS AT ITS LOWEST LEVEL, E.G. IMETP 34 PERCENT AND FMS 50 PERCENT OF FY79 LEVELS WITH NONEXISTANT FMS TRAINING. PRESENT INDICATIOIS ARE THAT GOI WILL PURCHASE APPROXIMATELY DOLS 600 K TRAINING TRAIING THROUGH FMS, IMPOSING ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD. IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH GOI HAS ALSO RESULTED IN MORE FREQUENT VISITS TO MEET WITH GOI OFFICIALS, OFTEN RESULTING IN ADDITIONAL GOOD WILL GESTURE INVITATIONS TO MILITARY FACILITIES. THUS TDY REQUIREMENTS HAVE INCREASED CONSIDERABLY TO MILITARY INSTALLATIONS HOUSING AND BERTHING US PROVIDED EQUIPMENT. COPING WITH THE INCREASED TDY LOAD HAS FURTHER REDUCED THE ON STATION MILITARY MANNING AS TDY AND LEAVES IN FY78 RESULTED IN FOUR MAN-MONTHS ABSENCE FROM DUTY STATION. AT THIS LEVEL, CURRENTLY ASSIGNED AND AUTHORIZED MANNING IS FULLY UTILIZED.

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INCREMENTAL LEVEL A: ACROSS THE BOARD INCREASE UNDER THIS LEVEL IS ESTIMATED AT 10 PERCENT. MANAGEMENT OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AT THIS LEVEL COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH CURRENT MANNING BY RE-ASSIGNING OF PRIORITIES WITH NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT, IF ANY, ON MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT.

INCREMENTAL LEVEL B: IN ADDITION TO AN ESTIMATED 10 PERCENT INCREASE IN FMS, THIS LEVEL WOULD ACCOMMODATE A 50 PERCENT INCREASE IN BOTH FMS TRAINING AND THE IMETP, ALREADY REPRESENTING GOI IDENTIFIED REQUIREMENT FOR FY80. HENCE, THIS LEVEL WOULD REQUIRE ONE ADDITIONAL MILITARY BILLET, TO ACCOMMODATE THE 50 PERCENT INCREASE IN THE IMET AND FMS TRAINING PROGRAM WITH IMET LEVEL REPRESENTING NEARLY A FIVE-FOLD INCREASE SINCE THE

MILITARY MANNING WAS REDUCED TO THE CURRENT LEVEL.

PARA 3A(13) (H): GOI PRESENTLY MAKES MAXIMUM USE OF INDIGENOUS SOURCES FOR TRAINING; NO TRAINING PROPOSED IN ANY LEVEL IS AVAILABLE LOCALLY. TRAINING THAT COULD BE SUBSTITUTED FROM THIRD COUNTRIES WOULD BE OF INFERIOR QUALITY. GOI WILL PURCHASE THROUGH FMS ESSENTIAL TRAINING NOT AVAILABLE THROUGH IMETP. ANY CUTS IN IMET TRAINING WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSE GOI TO SEEK TRAINING, IN MANY CASES, FROM THE SOVIETS WHICH WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO THE ESTABLISHED GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR INDIA. THE SOVIETS CURRENTLY PROVIDE MAJORITY OF GOI TRAINING AND COULD EASILY FILL THE VOID IF THE IMETP WAS REDUCED.

PARA 3(A)(13)(I): FMS IMET  
 LEVEL FY80 81 82 FY80 81 82  
 MINIMUM 2.5 2.8 3.0 0.3 0.3 0.3  
 INTERMEDIATE 3.0 3.2 3.6 0.4 0.4 0.5  
 CURRENT 3.2 3.6 3.9 0.6 0.6 0.7  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SECURITY, MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 24 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978NEWDE11261  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** X1  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
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**From:** NEW DELHI  
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**Message ID:** b732f96d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION PM  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
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**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 78 STATE 167901, 78 STATE 182987  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 28 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1908106  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** THE FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR INDIA  
**TAGS:** MASS, MPOL, IN  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/b732f96d-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
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**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014